1000 Alitalia in one shot: so' forti 'sti Amerikani .... (II)

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Thanks for your reply. You prefer to emphasize some market features (OTC derivatives and CDSs) that you consider potentially dangerous. I think that such potential danger exists but what has happened has less to do with sophisticated and more with simple instruments that have progressively turned into sophisticated ones (Sogen has been damaged by an employee who were trading simple index futures). As I said previously there is a widespread attitude toward reciprocal control in OTC markets, aimed at reducing counterparty risk. I allow to your main argument that in the CDS OTC market it is spreading the opinion that the outstanding amount of such contracts is much greater than the actual amount of bonds (which are the standard CDS's underlying assets) issued by the companies/banks which are the targets of such derivatives. You should consider that such outstanding amount does not net out offsetting positions and that someone could buy protections on his loans as well.
Actually this means that the picture is somewhat worse and maybe is not an unlikely product of unlucky events.
Let's start from the beginning. In the '90s the big (american) investments banks were making profits because of two main reasons: they were actually smarter in pricing and trading derivatives (were they had competitive advantages) and they were ready to exploit the bull bond market which was driven by the "secular" fall of interest rates after inflation was eventually curbed. When such conditions come to an end, because interest cannot turn negative they were looking for new revenues. In the meanwhile their competitive advantages were reducing. Here came the dotcom/tech bubble. They gained big commissions and fees by bringing into the market the new companies, helping mergers and takeovers spurred by the bouyant market. They did not take big risks and the stocks were placed into the market. At the end the losses were borne by the investors. The bubble bursted and then, to fight the recessionary winds, Mr. Greenspan cut the interest to historical low levels. This provided the fuel for the next trip. Low rates spurred mortgages. Unfortunately they are booked and accounted on an accrual basis. Then came the IB who turned the flows into present value through securitization. Origination of new securities took place starting again to pour commissions into IB pockets. Mortgages were tranched into securities segmented according to their riskiness which was related to some kind of preferred rights to reimbursement over the mortgage pools that were given to the best rated securities. Rating was the new trick and rating agencies were called in to help the new business. They provided bright ratings. Initially it made sense: only (or mainly) prime mortgages were addressed. But when prime mortgages were exploited they cannot do without securitization commissions any more and they started to look at more risky loans. Actually the true lenders were strictly tuned because they needed new business as well and they were transferring the risks! Rating agencies started to close their eyes. They simply required to slightly increase the risky tranches of the subprime mortgage pools. But the commission hunger was endless. Someone devised new ABS backed by...other ABSs (unsold tranches...), CDO backed by ABS, CDO squared backed by ABS on ABSs. Insurance companies provided their guarantee and rating agencies endorsed. This time the rubbish was sold only partly. It remained in the books of the IBs (and other banks as well). Here one little explanation is needed. According to regulatory constraints banks are due to set aside their capital in a fixed proportion of their loans for credit risk. Securities are different. They fall under market risk and the main banks are allowed to calculate the riskiness of their portfolio and the capital required according to their own internal model (though validated by the regulators). Such models usually allow a substantial reduction of required capital. Here you have the unprecedented leverage. You simply need to turn credit risk into market risk through well suited and well rated securities (you do not strictly need CDSs even if you can find them somewhere). When the market was quiet the volatility of such securities was very low and the calculated risk and capital were small. They were rated and priced as if the house market was going the grow forever. Some (willing ?)confusion was added by the fact that the rating labels provided by the agencies were exactly following the same patterns used for corporate bonds. They eventually said that some misunderstanding was possible: the same letters do not have exactly the same meaning...

The story can go on, but it's late and I need to stop here.