Analysis From Tehran

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We received and gladly publish this analysis, from a reader whose identity, for obvious reason, we will keep anonymous.

On June 12th 2009 Iranian people showed up in record numbers at poll stations around the world to elect their 10th president. The official result that came out few hours after closing poll stations shocked everyone. Even Iran’s supreme leader, Seyed Ali Khamenei, called it a “miracle of God”. More than 39 million people cast their votes and incumbent president Mahmoud Ahmadi Nejad won the election with 63 percent of the votes (24.5 million votes). Following the announcement of the official results, the challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi raised the allegation of election fraud, which has taken the country to an unprecedented turmoil since Saturday. The events that are happening in the aftermath of the election are indeed historic and could possibly change the future of Iran and the world, one way or the other. Here I try to recap on what has happened and share my views.

What was shocking and why was it shocking?

An 85 percent voters turnout was way beyond polls predictions. The highest participation rate (of 79 percent) in the past happened in 1997 (which lead to the election of reformer Mohammad Khatami.). The most optimistic polls this year predicted around 70 percent turnout. So the voter turnout was definitely shocking.

Another surprising number is the 24 and a half million votes for Ahmadi Nejad. This number also defies the prediction of the most optimist polls. Regardless of the participation rate, the number is surprisingly high.

The puzzle gets deeper when we put these two numbers together. He won almost 63 percent of the votes. Why is this puzzling? Let’s compare numbers to the election in 2005. In that year, 62 percent participated and Ahmadi Nejad got 17 million votes, about 63 percent. This means, if the numbers are right, all people who chose to participate in this year’s election (and did not participate in 2005) voted on average at the same rate of 63 percent for Ahmadi Nejad. This cannot be true. Why? The answer is in demographics.

Ahmadi Nejad voters come from two groups: Ultra-conservatives and people in rural areas and city margins. Participation of theses group in elections does not change significantly. They always vote and they always vote for conservative candidates. Swing voters in Iran come from educated middle class living in the cities. These people either stay at home or come out and vote for reformers. So when the participation rate increases, this will disproportionately affect the votes of the reformist candidates.

In 2009, 12 millions more people voted. Based on the demographics of the new voters and poll results, Ahmadi Nejad could not have won more than 40 percent of these people. This means if he could keep his 17 millions from 2005, the best outcome for him could have been a little less than 22 millions (which would have been enough for a victory by the way).

By all account Ahmadi Nejad was losing support during the final two weeks of the campaign period. Televised debates did not work in his favor. Also, during those weeks many people changed their mind and decided to participate in the election. Many of them have never voted over the past 30 years.

Based on these numbers and the assumption that high turnout favors reformists, people are shocked to see Ahmadi Nejad come out as the winner. In the eye of the average voter (especially in large cities) this could mean only on thing: there has got to be cheating.

So where is the smoking gun?

The truth is that no one knows. It is not even clear whether anyone will ever be able to find a hard evidence for fraud. The interior ministry, who is in charge of the election, so far has refused to publish the detailed results by districts. Even if they do it now it is not going to help them. Their credibility is severely damaged and any number that comes out in support of their official result will be regarded as fake.

On the other hand, Mousavi’s camp claims that their representatives were not allowed to be present at the counts (interior ministry disputes this claim). This means they have very little to show for the bold claim that they are making. The best they could do so far is to raise probing questions. One of them is the outcome among Azeri minorities (Mousavi is an Azeri). Historically, Azeri people have disproportionately voted for Azeri candidates. This year, however, Mousavi won in Azeri provinces by a very narrow margin (between 52 and 51 percent).

Another point they raised was that in some places the number of votes exceeded the number of eligible voters by as much as 40 percent. To which interior ministry responds by pointing out people may have been traveling and voted outside their hometown.

By far the biggest claim that has come out of Mousavi’s camp is the allegation of a coup. In his first press conference on Friday midnight he told people that he is the winner and any official result other than that is a fraud. He also asked people to come out to the streets and stay until the truth is told. This was the first time in 30 years that a person (who is part of the establishment, by the way) has openly invited people to civil resistance.

He is basically claiming that some rouge elements within the system were surprised and unhappy by the results and decided to change it over night. What makes many people to believe him is an announcement by Revolutionary Guards on Thursday (one day before election) that they will not tolerate a “colored revolution”. They have also announced a “security exercise” in Tehran for Saturday (that is basically a warning to people that armed forces will be on the street to show their power). They also shot down SMS text messaging system and jammed the phone signals starting Friday morning. It sounds like they were prepared.

These are very significant facts. Mousavi has taken a very bold step and brought millions of people in the streets. He is putting his own life, and the stability of a regime he is loyal to, in danger. He must have known something. He apparently does not have concrete evidence for fraud. But he must have something to base this movement on. But no one knows what it is.

The political system in Iran is very complicated. The dynamics between key players is also very complicated. Many disputes over the past 30 years have been resolved behind closed doors. This is the first time that a disagreement between factions of the regime is coming to the streets and being played on the media around the world. This makes many people in the regime extremely nervous.

What will happen next?

Despite protests against the official results from the early hours of Saturday, the [religious NdR] leader congratulated the winner and thereby confirmed the results. Although later he asked the Guardian Council to look into the complaints, he also mentioned that in his view this was a very healthy election. The support of the result by the [religious NdR] leader and the disregarding of protests has effectively eliminated the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the dispute within the Iranian political system.

In a press conference Ahmadi Nejad claimed that Iran is the “most stable country in the world”. He was not much on the mark this time. Iran was a very stable country until Saturday. But the mismanagement of his administration in handling the election and the disputes after that changed everything forever. Hundreds of thousands of people are on the streets everyday. There have been attacks by Basij Milita at many universities. Until Wednesday at least 15 people are confirmed dead (7 of them students who were attacked in their dormitory). And all of this right in front of the world’s eyes. You know it is big when the football players show their solidarity with people by wearing green wristbands at international games (and risk their future career). This means that the protest reached far beyond the spoiled rich kids who tweet from north of Tehran.

In my view the Friday prayer is the key event to watch. The supreme leader will be the speaker at the Friday prayer. Mousavi and Karroubi (the other reformist candidate) have asked their supporters to show up at the prayer and let the leader hear their voice directly. What the leader has to say and the way he says it will determine the direction that this will take. Either someone concedes and makes compromises or there will be more blood. Whatever the outcome is, Iran has changed forever. Ahmadi Nejad made sure of that.

Indietro

Commenti

Ci sono 8 commenti

I think the alleged fraud looks evident in some circles where Ahmadinejad is quite unpopular. When I was a student in Italy nobody openly admitted to vote for the major party of the time, I think at some extent the same happens everywhere.

Said that, what puzzles me is that Ahmadinejad supposedly had a tight majority in the Teheran district: why we don't see his supporters in the streets too? I find quite hard to buy that the communication blackout was accidental and not part of some trick by the interior ministry, but it's even harder to believe that half the population of Teheran is pro-ahmadinejad but too shy to show up in the streets.

Se non vi disturba, ho provato a tradurre l'articolo e l'ho pubblicoato nel mio blog, ovviamente linkandovi. Eventualmente provvederò a rimuovere il post.

Non disturba proprio, anzi! Grazie.


Metti qui un link al tuo post, così chi vuole leggerlo in italiano fa "click" ...

I think that the issue is not about what are the "true" results, as we were commenting polls in a democratic country. An election held under such circumstances (candidates approved by a religious court, the army and the religious leaders flanking on one side, government controlled media, a vast use of intimidation on the opposition candidates and electors) is anyway a farce when measured according to democratic standards. The possibility of wide scaled fraud just make the whole situation more evident.

The point at stake is rather that Moussawi, backed by the most lively and progressive part of the nation has decided to openly challenge the regime.
I hope the guy knows what he's doing, but I'm very much afraid that if is not able to split the clergy and/or the army gaining support of at least some of them, we"ll see a bloody crackdown taking place there.

Mi sembrano molto interessanti, soprattutto per noi economisti e altre persone un po' cerebrolese da troppi anni in academia, le analisi su 538.com:

 

www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/karroubis-unlucky-7s.html

 

www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/ahmadinejads-rural-votes.html

 

www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/unconvincing-to-me-use-of-benfords-law.html

 

P.S.: are we supposed to comment on the English version or on the Italian version of this article? As it is, it's a little confusing, and at the risk of losing momentum due to the split-up into two separate discussion threads...

 

P.S.: are we supposed to comment on the English version or on the Italian version of this article? As it is, it's a little confusing, and at the risk of losing momentum due to the split-up into two separate discussion threads...

 

I am afraid you are supposed to do what you want to !

:-)

Battute peregrine mie a parte, sì forse il dibattito è meglio in margine a quello italiano, che ora è in frontespizio. L'articolo originale era in inglese e tradurre richiede tempo, più di quanto si pensi e, anche se si parte da un'ottima base come quella che ci ha fornito Ilenia (che ringrazio di nuovo) ci sono sempre dieci typos, cinque confusioni, un falso amico ...

Anyhow, consiglio saltare all'italiano. Fatta eccezione per le poche volte che scriviamo di economia USA o mondiale, i lettori di nFA sono quasi tutti di lingua italiana.