Matteo Renzi had a great start, during the past couple months, as new leader of the Democratic Party. He was just doing all the right things: getting rid of an old, ineffectual party leadership, working at a much-needed new electoral law to avoid the need for inconclusive bipartisan grand coalitions (like the current one) and ensure government stability, and drafting economic reforms to put an end to 15 years of painful economic decline in Italy. He repeatedly reassured Italians he would not play old politics and change ministers -- "I want to change Italy, not the government", he said many times. This looked and sounded great. At the next general elections (due in 2018, unless the President, Mr. Napolitano, calls for an early round) Italy would have had a fresh, credible alternative to the still unpresentable (i.e., still Berlusconi-ridden) Italian right and, most important, to the dangerous populist party led by Mr. Grillo, a wonderful comedian turned into an awful politician. At that point, he would have probably got plenty of votes, even from many Italians who did not support the Democratic Party in the past, even from part of the many angry, frustrated voters who turned to Mr. Grillo for lack of decent alternatives. "Renzi is our last chance", many such voters remarked.
Alas, all this came to a sudden end almost overnight. Like under a magic, evil spell, the fresh Mr. Renzi now looks as old as the old leaders he has been energetically scrapping during the past couple years (because of this attitude he is known as "the scrapper", il rottamatore). Mr. Renzi, supported by the vast majority of the Democratic Party's leadership, decided to tear down the government led by another young (although part of the old leadership) Democratic Party leader, Enrico Letta, who is resigning today. Unless Mr. Renzi surprises everyone with an unexpected plan, and because Mr. Napolitano said he would not call a general election, the most likely scenario is a new government supported by more or less the same parliamentary majority and led by Mr. Renzi himself. The pretext is the need to speed-up reforms. But this sounds like a blatant lie even to the most casual oberver. The undeniable inconclusiveness of Mr. Letta's goverment was not due to the prime minister -- let alone the other ministers -- but to a paralyzing grand coalition. No serious reform is possible in the current state of things, even if Mr. Renzi is the prime minister.
Now, Mr. Renzi is not a dumb person, so he understands this. What was he thinking, then, when he decided to execute this plan? It's hard to tell. He probably realized a new electoral law (which is likely to be passed soon) would not have been a sufficient condition for Mr. Napolitano to call for a general election (although this would have been a sensible expectation given that the Constitutional Court recently deemed the current electoral law unconstitutional; it's quite odd for a democratic country to have a parliament elected with an unlawful procedure). But this could have actually been a blessing: Mr. Renzi would have had at least three years to get ready for the electoral campaing, put together a solid platform of economic reforms, and carefully select candidates to the new parliament via transparent democratic procedures (and so outperform Mr. Berlusconi, who insists for giving party leaders full discretion in choosing candidates even under the new electoral law). What a waste! Maybe he reckons he can't wait this long and bear the responsibility for the inconclusiveness of the government. Or, maybe, he reckons he can be in a better position campaigning while in office and, most important, without Mr. Letta threatening his nomination for prime minister. But there are many pitfalls, too, in the execution of this plan. For instance, why on earth would his future opponents (now into the grand coalition) allow him to take merit for those reforms he thinks Mr. Letta could not do but he can do? [See Andrea Moro's comment below on this basic, "game-theoretic" point]. I'm not sure whether and how these pitfalls were fully factored into the decision.
Whatever the reason, and whatever the final cost-benefit assessment was (or, even worse, whatever the "objective function" was), the evil spell is cast. Mr. Renzi now looks like the best vintage of opaque Italian politics, and (because of this) he has probably irremediably lost the support of many people (e.g., me), who were strongly determined to vote for him at the next general election. That's too bad (or it's good that the real nature of this young leader is finally fully revealed even to fools like myself, it depends on the viewpoint). So long, Mr. Renzi. Silvio Berlusconi, Mr. Grillo, and your bitter enemies inside the Democratic Party are certainly taking great delight in this move. For Italy, instead, it's again time to say "good night, and good luck".
Forse mi manca la capacità di analisi strategica del PD, ma non ho sentito, nella relazione di Renzi alcun riferimento al perché gli alleati dovrebbero fare harakiri permettendogli di fare quello che lui vuole fare e che Letta non è riuscito. Ho visto un 15' minuti di altri interventi, nessuno che gli chiedesse "Perché?". L'unico critico, quello di Civati, contiene quasi tutte affermazioni condivisibili, contiene l'incredulità che credo sia comune a molti di fronte ad una scelta difficile da capire, ma non spinge Renzi ad articolare il ragionamento strategico alla base della sua decisione. Dai 5 anni in su, ci spiega il nostro collega Rustichini, si impara a chiedersi: ma se io faccio questa mossa, il mio avversario come muoverà? Alfano ci sta a far fare a Renzi la parte dell'eroe? Grillo? Berlusconi?
Renzi, a sentire le sue parole, si sta sacrificando perché il governo Letta non può fare le riforme di cui il paese ha bisogno. Vuole scegliere "la strada meno battuta, quella più difficile". Ma non ci dice perché. Se è la strada meno battuta, in prima approssimazione il motivo è perché non porta a destinazione. Non spiega perché la motivazione ovvia all'impasse governativa (la mancanza di una vera maggioranza in parlamento) e la soluzione altrettanto ovvia (una nuova legge elettorale/riforma anche costituzionale, la rottamazione della classe politica - non solo del PD che lui ha promesso) non siano valide, o perché non siano percorribili, e non spiega perché l'indubbio suo potere carismatico sia tale da superare gli ovvi ostacoli che incontrerà scontrandosi con gli alleati.
credo che il senso della strategia di renzi sia più o meno quello suggerito qui e quo: la strada alternativa (sostenere letta senza poter effettivamente controllare l'esecutivo) sarebbe stata logorante e avrebbe favorito in campagna elettorale le opposizioni estremiste.
per quanto riguarda i compagni di coalizione, un efficace riassunto qua.